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A Comparative and International Law
Perspective on the United States
(Non)Compliance with its Duty of Non-
Refoulement
by Kathleen M. Keller
INTRODUCTION
1 If there are two groups of individuals who currently have very little
support among the American people and legislature, it is surely
immigrants and criminals. As a result, the brunt of the 1996 immigration
reforms fell hardest upon those with criminal backgrounds. The campaign
to reform the immigration laws was sold to the American public as a
campaign to expel "undeserving aliens," chief among them the so-called
"criminal aliens.' However, this politically expedient reform was executed
at the expense of the United States obligation of non-refoulement under the
Convention Relating to Refugees. As a result, untold numbers of refugees
are now eligible to be returned to certain death and imprisonment because
of minor or unproven criminal histories. Every such instance of
refoulement will constitute a violation of international law.
2 The duty of non-refoulement is at the heart of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.2 It is through the concept of non-
refoulement that the Convention signatories expressed their commitment
that refugees would never again be returned to face death or
imprisonment, as had many Jewish refugees during the Holocaust. Most
signatory nations have historically taken this commitment seriously, giving
more deference to the Convention's words than they have to other
international instruments. The United States has been party to the
Convention since 1968, when it acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
1. See, e.g., William Branigin, Citizenship Allegations Called 'Reckless' by INS; Record Number
of Criminal Expulsions Claimed, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1996, at A4; William Branigin, Congress
Finishes Major Legislation, Wash. Post, Oct. 1,1996 at Al.
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee
Convention].
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Status of Refugees.! And, like most nations, the U.S has for the most part
taken this commitment to heart. Citations to the Convention have occurred
in administrative guidelines, in federal case law, in the pages of the
Congressional Record, and even in the United States Code itself. However,
recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act have chipped
away at Convention compliance. One notable way in which the changes
have affected the duty of non-refoulement is by greatly expanding the class
of individuals subject to deportation based upon actual or alleged criminal
acts. The Convention allows for the return of certain "undeserving"
refugees. However, U.S. law now goes far beyond what the Convention
allows, mandating deportation for many persons who have valid claims for
non-refoulement under the Convention.
3 Against our international law obligations and the moral imperative
not to peremptorily return individuals to their death, we should weigh the
United States' interests in tightening immigration laws. The 1996 changes,
lik many of the earlier changes to the immigration law, were fueled by the
perception that immigrants are an undue burden on the United States.
Immigrants with criminal histories, like immigrants receiving public
benefits, were therefore an obvious target. In the words of one federal
judge, "[tihe Attorney General is not obliged to shelter people from
despotic persecution abroad so that they may enjoy lawful imprisonment
in the United States. 4 In addition, much of the 1996 law was motivated by
a perception that many asylum claims are frivolous moves intended to
postpone inevitable deportation.s However, the United State's interest in
expediency and economy pale in comparison with the importance of the
fundamental human rights norm of non-refoulement embodied by the
Refugee Convention. As this Note will show, the drafters of the Refugee
Convention carefully provided a certain level of protection for host
countries. Other countries have found that they can adhere to the norms
established by the Convention without too great a cost to their society.
Surely the United States may also strike such a balance within the demands
of the Convention.
[4 This Note will examine how the United States immigration law has
become increasingly out of synch with the mandate of the Refugee
Convention. Section One will show that non-refoulement is one of the
most widely respected human rights norms. This section will also examine
the various exceptions to non-refoulement allowed by the Refugee
Convention, discussing how each exception has been interpreted by both
international law experts and various signatory countries. Section Two
will deal with U.S. compliance under the Refugee Convention. It will
3. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 1967) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
4. Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619 (2d Cir. 1993). Note, however, that this opinion
ignores the Attorney General's obligation to comply with international law, which is
addressed throughout this Note.
5. See DAvID REIMERS, UNWELCOME STRANGERS 141 (1998); Scott Busby, The Politics of
Protection: Limits and Possibilities in the Implementation of International Refitgee Nons in the
United States, 15 BERK. J. INT'L L. 27,33-34 (1997).
[Vol. 2
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begin by showing that the Congress and federal courts have long
considered the duty of non-refoulement to be binding. However, since
1990, the immigration laws have gradually expanded the class of persons
subject to exceptions, so that the class now far exceeds what is permitted by
the Refugee Convention. I conclude that the U.S. law not only violates the
letter and spirit of the Refugee Convention, but is also out of line with the
interpretations accorded the Convention by other signatory nations. The
conclusion will also outline specific changes that can be made in order to
bring the U.S. into compliance with the standard interpretations of the
Refugee Convention.
I. THE MANDATE OF NON-REFOULEMENT
5 The duty of non-refoulement is enshrined in Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention, which prohibits returning any refugee to a country
"where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion." Article 33 provides an exception for any refugee
"whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is," or
"who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 6
In addition, the duty of non-refoulement may be further limited by the
Article 1 of the Convention, which states that the term "refugee," by
definition, does not include individuals who have:
"committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity. ..,,
committed "a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to the country of refuge," or
"been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations."9
A. Significance in International Law
6 The duty of non-refoulement is so widely accepted and highly
respected within international law that it appears to have achieved the
status of customary international law,' indicating that it would be
6. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(2).
7. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1F(a).
8. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1F(b).
9. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. IF(c)
10. The Restatmnent of Law states that "[clustomary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed from a sense of legal obligation."
Restatement (Third) of the Law, §102(2). Specifically, the Restatement says that
"[I]ntemational agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the'
creation of customary international law [for states which are not parties] when such
agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accept6d." Id.
1999]
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obligatory even without the clear language of the Refugee Convention."
Professor Goodwin-Gill argues that, "[t]here is substantial, if not
conclusive, authority that the principle is binding in all states,
independently of specific assent. State practice before 1951 is, at the least,
equivocal as to whether, in that year, Article 33 of the Convention reflected
or crystallized a rule of customary international law.'02 As a result, most
states are reluctant to admit to a violation of their Article 33 obligations. 3
[7 A host of international agreements attest to non-refoulement's
broad acceptance within international law. These instruments have
steadily expanded the doctrine's scope outside the Refugee Convention.
Under the general body of human rights law, the right of non-refoulement
is frequently considered to extend beyond those persecuted for the reasons
enumerated in the Refugee Convention 4, to provide protection to all
immigrants, depending on the conditions in their home country.'5 Article
45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits refoulement to a
country where there are Geneva Convention violations, and any
deportation which violates this mandate is considered a "grave breach" of
the Convention. 6 Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prohibits any
refoulement to a country where there are "substantial grounds" for
believing the individual will be a victim of torture. 7 And the European
Commission on Human Rights has interpreted Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights to provide a right of non-refoulement to any
country where the person would be subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment.8 In sum, the international community has signaled
its consistent respect for non-refoulement.
B. Interpretations of the Exceptions Within International Law
8 The purpose of the enumerated exceptions to non-refoulement was
to strengthen the norm of non-refoulement by making it a realistic policy
for host countries. The preparatory works of the Convention demonstrate
that the Convention diafters intended to strike a balance between
at § 102(3).
11. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229,
251 (1996) ("The most enduring contribution' of the Convention is its elevation of
nonrefoulement to the status of an obligatory norm.").
12. GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE iN INTEPNATIONAL LAW 97 (1983).
13. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 11, at 237.
14. Race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political
opinion are the five bases for Article 33 protection specified in the Refugee Convention.
15. See, e.g., Karen Parker, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, in REFUGEE LAW
AND POLY 33,35 (Ved P. Nanda, eds., 1989).
16. See Parker, supra note 15, at 38.
17. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4,1985, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (entered
into force June 26,1987).
18. See David Scott Nance, The Individual Rights to Asylum Under Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 477 (1987)
[Vol. 2
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protecting refugees, including those with criminal histories, and protecting
the host countries' communities from potentially dangerous criminals.' 9
The drafters of the Refugee Convention debated whether the host country
should have discretion in applying the exceptions, or whether the
exceptions should be a mandatory bar to receiving refugee status. The
United States argued that the host country should have the discretion to
grant refugee status even if the individual fell into one of the categorical
exceptions to refugee status. The end compromise was that exclusion
would be mandatory only for those individuals who had committed an
Article 1(F)(a) "crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity." All other exceptions were to be applied at the host country's
discretion.2 As stated above, there are two classes of exceptions that may
apply to the duty of non-refoulement. These are the exceptions contained
within Article 33, which are specific to non-refoulement, and the
exceptions contained within Article 1, which relate to the definition of
refugee. Some commentators have asserted that an individual with an
Article 33 claim to non-refoulement is not affected by the definitional
exceptions of Article 1.21 However, because Article 33 specifically employs
the term "refugee" (as opposed to "person" or "individual") and because
Article 1 states that its exceptions apply to all the Convention's protections,
one may reasonably conclude that Article 33 incorporates the additional
Article 1 exceptions. When one considers the spirit of Article 33, which is
to provide absolute protection for the most at-risk individuals, it is odd to
conclude that the Article 33 requirements impose a burden above and
beyond that imposed upon the ordinary refugee seeker.' However, a
strictly textualist approach would support the view that a signatory nation
could apply the Article 1 exceptions to an individual seeking non-
refoulement without violating the Refugee Convention.
1. Threats to Security
19 The Article 33 "threats to security" exception appears to be fairly
narrowly applied. A strict construction would allow the return of any
refugee "whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to
the security of the country," regardless of whether this danger was
previously manifested in criminal acts. However, perhaps due to
evidentiary concerns, this bar is typically applied only in the case of
immigrants who have manifested their dangerousness by criminal acts.
For instance, the Swedish Aliens Act allows return if the alien has already
19. See Evangeline G. Abriel, The Effect of Criminal Conduct Upon Refugee and Asylum Status,
3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AMERIcAS 359,364 (1996).
20. See JAMEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUS 214-16 (1991).
21. Id. at 364-65 ([W]hile a serious crime may be sufficient to deny refugee status, it takes
a 'particularly serious crime' to deny non-refoulement. ..")
22. On the other hand, because states are required to accept refugees who meet the Article
33 requirements, it may be reasonable to expect these individuals to meet a more exacting
standard of behavior.
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taken part in activities that make him a security risk, and can still be
considered to be such a risk.Y Gunnel Stenberg argues that the "security"
clause is meant to be more restrictive than the "particularly serious crime"
clause that follows. He contends that only "refugees who seriously
threaten the foundations of the State or even its existence" fall under this
bar.24 Because of the narrow applicability and the evidentiary concerns, in
practice, the "security" bar appears to have been largely subsumed under
the "particularly serious crime" bar.
2. Particularly Serious Crime
[10 The first threshold question in applying this bar is whether the
Refugee Convention's language of "a refugee... who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of that country" imposes one or two
requirements. In other words, is commission of a dangerous crime per se
evidence of dangerousness to the community, or must the two aspects be
proved independently?
[11 Some commentators have argued that the terminology and
jurisprudence are ambiguous. However, the weight of opinion has
concluded that the two are separate requirements for applying the bar.Y"
The United National High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
guidelines follow this approach, stating that:
Whether the commission of a crime by a refugee makes him a
danger to the community is a quaestio facti.... [A] person, who...
has been convicted for a capital crime-which he has committed in
a state of emotional stress or in self-defense--would not constitute
a danger to the communityY
The Germans have explicitly adopted this approach, requiring their Aliens
Office to establish that the alien is in danger of relapsing into crime and
thereby constitutes a serious threat to the community before refoulement is
allowed.'
[12 The second threshold question in applying this bar is what types of
crimes are "particularly serious." Many international jurists recommend a
balancing approach over any per se definition, arguing that "the
application of Article 33(2) ought always to involve the question of
proportionality, with account taken of the nature of the consequences likely
to befall the refugee on return. '
23. See GUNNEL STENBERG, NON-ExPuLsION AND NoN-REFOULEMENT 221 (1989).
24. Id. at 220.
25. See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 12, at 96.
26. See, e.g., STENBERG, supra note 24, at 221.
27. See id. at 228.
28. See id. at 221.
29. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 12, at 96. However, Grahl-Madsen suggests a possible
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[13 It is clear that the Refugee Convention drafters attempted to make
this a very narrow exception. In the original draft, the language for the
exception was "particularly serious crimes or offences" but the language
was changed to the singular because "the Conference wished to point out
that continuous criminality in itself should not motivate return to a country
of persecution."30 The UNHCR recommends a contextual approach and has
issued the following guidelines for applying the "particularly serious
crime" exception:
Repatriation must only be applied as a last resort where no other
measures appear possible to prevent the person from endangering
the community... What constitutes an offence permitting forcible
repatriation in one case may not be such an offense in another case
because of the circumstances of the crime and the character of the
criminal. Only where one or several convictions are symptomatic
of the basically criminal, incorrigible nature of the person and
where any other measure (detention, assigned residence,
resettlement in another country) are [sic] not practical to prevent




f14 The Swedish courts have opted for a contextualist approach in
applying their immigration law, which incorporates the Convention terms
almost exactly. This approach is inevitably amenable to arbitrary
application. For instance, in one case the Swedish Court of Appeal
expelled a South African who had been sentenced to a cumulative six and a
half years for drug offenses. But in another case, the Court of Appeal
found that an Eastern European who had been sentenced to an aggregate
fifteen years for drug offenses and smuggling, had not committed crimes
which would invoke the "particularly serious crime" exception.3 However,
the contextual approach allows the courts to remain true to the spirit of the
Refugee Convention. For instance, in one case an individual, who was
convicted of grand larceny, robbery, grand robbery and serious smuggling
of goods and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison, was
determined to have committed a "particularly serious crime" but was not
expelled because of the "particularly serious" nature of the persecution he
faced.' Similarly, the Canadians will look both to the context of the crime
altemative-that a particularly serious crime is any crime for which the punishment in
Europe or North America is five years or more of incarceration or death. See GRAHL MADSEN,
1 STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (1966). This approach already recognizes
that some countries apply criminal sanctions more readily than do others, and therefore that
using the duration of the criminal sentence as a proxy for seriousness is problematic. As the
United States imposes ever-longer terms of incarceration for non-violent crimes, such a per se
approach becomes increasingly untenable.
30. See STENBERG, supra note 24 at 228.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 232.
33. See id. at 235.
1999]
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and the degree of persecution faced in the home country when determining
whether a crime is "particularly serious" and whether the individual is a
"danger to the community."
3. Crimes in violation of international human rights law
15 Article 1(F)(a) of the Refugee Convention Crime explicitly excludes
from the definition of "refugee" individuals who have committed crimes
against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The exceptions,
contained in Article 1(F)(a), are meant to accord with the definitions found
in the relevant international treaties and United Nations resolutions.3 The
original intent was for the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions to govern the definitions of "crimes
against peace" and "war crimes,"3 but it is reasonable to presume that the
definitions have evolved along with international law. The International
Law Commission (ILC) interprets the scope of 1(F)(a) as being limited to
"crimes which affect the very foundation of human society," taking into
consideration "the nature of the act in question (cruelty, monstrousness,
barbarity, etc.) or... the extent of its effects (massiveness, the victims being
peoples, populations or ethnic groups), or ... the motive of the perpetrator
(for example, genocide) or... several of these elements."37 The ILC also
recommends recognition of the affirmative defenses of coercion and
necessity, so long as the harm inflicted by the refugee is not greater than
the harm the refugee would face if repatriated.'
16 Signatory countries have typically limited the application of these
clauses to particularly shocking crimes in which the refugee had direct
involvement. For instance, in refusing to apply Article 1(F)(a) to a refugee
who had been an Iranian official during the 1980s, a Belgian court held that
"the only fact of having occupied responsible posts in a regime of which
certain authorities have been guilty of serious violations of fundamental
individual rights, is insufficient.. .to justify the application of an exclusion
clause..." The court held that, in order to repatriate, the government must
show that "there exists serious reasons to believe that the claimant has
directly committed crimes against humanity.. ." Because the individual in
question had not had any authority over the abusive corps, he was not
subject to refoulement.9 Likewise, the Canadian court has held that "mere
34. See Re Chu and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 161 D.L.R 4th 499 (June 1,
1998).
35. See European Union Joint Position of March 4,1996, O.J.C.E., 13 March 1996, N. L63/2,
§ 13.1 [hereinafter European Union]. This is in accordance with the intent of the Convention
drafters. See Hathaway supra note 20, at 214-16.
36. See GOODWIN-GiLL, supra note 12, at59.
37. Draft Art. 1, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on
the Work of its Thirty-Ninth Session 11(2), U.N. Doc. CAN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 2) at 13
(1987).
38. See id.
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membership in an organization that from time to time commits
international offences is not normally sufficient for exclusion from refugee
status." However, individuals who are both present at the scene of an
offense and are members in the offending group can be considered to be
"personal and knowing participants." As a result, the Canadians excluded
under Article 1(F)(a) an El Salvadoran army official who rounded up
people who were later tortured, but allowed another El Salvadoran, who
was forcibly conscripted and once witnessed fellow soldiers torturing a
civilian, to stay.4 This is similar to the approach that has been taken by the
Swiss, who allowed a member of the Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-
Leninist to remain because he did not play a causal role in the
"reprehensible acts" committed by his Party."
4. Serious Non-Political Crime Committed Outside the Country of
Refuge
17 The drafting history of this "serious non-political crime committed
outside the country of refuge" exception, found at Article 1F(b), suggests
that it was meant to provide a modification to the existing law of
extradition. As such, the Drafters intended it to apply only to individuals
who had committed crimes prior to entry into the host country and who
were fugitives from justice, not people who had been convicted and served
their time. This interpretation has been adopted by some countries,
including Canada.42
f18 The difficulty in applying this bar is two-fold: determining which
crimes are serious enough, and determining which crimes can be termed
"political." During the 1980s, when the United States was faced with about
125,000 Cubans seeking entry, it requested guidance from the UNHCR.
The High Commissioner's office UNHCR advised a contextual approach,
stating that:
If individual had committed homicide, rape, child molestation,
wounding, arson, drug trafficking or armed robbery, there would
be a rebuttable presumption of "serious, non-political crime;"
Burglary, stealing, receipt of stolen property, embezzlement, drug
possession and use, and assault could be considered "serious, non-
political" if combined with any of the following aggravating
factors: use of weapons, injury to persons, value of property,
dangerous drugs or evidence of habitual criminal conduct.
40. See Jeanne Donald & Dirk Vanheule, Canada, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? 165,218 (jean-Yves
Carlier et al. eds., 1997).
41. See Klaus Hullman, Switzerland, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? 111, 161 (jean-Yves Carlier, et
al. eds., 1997).
42. See Jeanne Donald & Dirk Vanheule, supra note 40, at 165,218.
1999]
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Either of the above could be rebutted by a finding of the following
mitigating factors: minority of offender, parole, five years or more
since conviction, general good character, offender was only an
accomplice, provocation or self-defense.'
Thus, the UNHCR approach is to consider the crime within the context of
the refugee's behavior.
19 The "serious" modifier has not been limited to crimes causing
death or bodily harm. As the UNHCR suggestions indicate, even drug
offenses may qualify if they are sufficiently serious. In France serious
breaches regarding dangerous narcotics are commonly considered "serious
common law crimes" for purposes of Article 1F(b).44 The Canadian Court
has indicated that for a crime to be "serious", it must "carry with it a heavy
penalty which at a minimum will entail a lengthy term of
imprisonment .... 45
20 Most parties also appear to agree that crimes that are extremely
violent are not "political," regardless of their motivation. The UNHCR
Handbook indicates that, in determining whether a crime is "political", an
adjudicator should look to its nature, the actors' motive, and whether there
is a close and direct causal link between the crime and the political
objective. UNHCR further states that tie political element should outweigh
the common law crime element, and the act should not be "grossly out of
proportion" to the political objective.4
21 The European Union states that "particularly cruel actions" can
always be termed "non-political."47 In this vein, the Canadian Federal
Court has stated that, "[o]ne must look to the target of the attacks to
determine whether a person can be classified as being a freedom fighter or
a terrorist," arguing that political crimes attack military or governmental
targets, whereas mere terrorists- attack civilian targets.' The United
Kingdom's test is whether there is a direct causal link between the offense
and any genuine political cause, and whether the offense is
disproportionate to the cause. Following this reasoning, the Court of
Appeal concluded that the bombing of an airport by an Algerian Muslim
paramilitary organization was not a political offense.'
922 An issue of debate is whether Article 1F(b) requires countries to
consider the severity of persecution that the individual would face upon
43. See GOODwiN-GILL, supra note 12, at 62-63.
44. See Klaudia Schank & Carlos Pena Galiano, France, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? 373, 421
(lean-Yves Carlier et al. eds., 1997).
45. Gil v. Canada, 119 D.L.R. 4 497,517 (Oct. 21,1994).
46. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK OF PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 152 (1992).
47. See id.
48. See Donald & Vanheule, supra note 40, at 219. In the case mentioned, the Canadian
court deported an Iranian claimant who had bombed the shops of merchants who supported
the Ayatollah.
49. See Dirk Vanhuele, United Kingdom, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? 563,606 (ean-Yves Carlier
et aL eds., 1997).
[Vol. 2
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repatriation. At least one member of the British House of Lords has held
that the definition of political "cannot depend on the consequences which
the offender may otherwise suffer if he is returned.' This case, however,
involved a claimant who had killed ten innocent bystanders in an airport,
an act that would not be considered political by any signatory country.
f23 In contrast, the European Union has advocated a balancing
approach, which takes into consideration both the context of the crime and
the nature of the persecution faced by the refugee in determining the
seriousness of a crime.5' This approach has been implemented by the
European Court of Human Rights. 2 The UNHCR has stated that countries
should balance the nature of the crime against the severity of the potential
persecution, and has indicated that this was the intent of the Convention
drafters.'
5. Crimes Contrary to the U.N. Principles
f24 Article 1(F)(c) excludes individuals who have committed crimes
contrary to the U.N. principles from the definition of "refugee." This
exemption is rarely applied 'nd seems to overlap almost entirely with the
Article 1(F)(a) exception for international human rights violators. The
European Union maintains that this clause "is directed notably at persons
in senior positions in the State who, by virtue of their responsibilities, have
ordered or lent their authority to action at variance with those purposes
and principles as well as at persons who, as members of the security forces,
have been prompted to assume personal responsibility for the performance
of such action.''  In one of the few cases regarding this clause, the
Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court held that membership in a
Uruguayan guerrilla movement did not constitute acts contrary to the aims
and principles of the United Nations.- In another case, the Canadian
courts overturned a holding by its Immigration and Refugee Board and
stated that extensive trafficking in heroine is not a crime contrary to the
principles and purposes of the United Nations.;
50. See T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 11996] 2 All E.R. 865, 882 (H.L.)
(Lord Mustill).
51. See European Union, supra note 36, at § 13.2.
52. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997).
53. Amicus Brief of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998), available in 1999 WL 33437, at 19.
54. See European Union, supra note 36, at § 13.3.
55. See Carlos Pena Galiano, Portugal, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? 527,736 (jean-Yves Carlier, et
al., eds. 1997).
56. See Re Pushpanathan and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 160 D.L.R. 4th 193
(June 4,1998).
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II. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS CONVENTION DUTY
A. Recognition of the Obligatory Nature of Non-Refoulement
25 The United States became a party to the Refugee Convention when
it acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.5 7 The
Protocol incorporates by reference the relevant provisions of the Refugee
Convention by stating in Article 1 that, "[tlhe States Parties to the present
Protocol undertake to apply article 2 to 34 inclusive of the [1951 Refugee]
Convention to refugees.. ."-8 In acceding to the Protocol, Congress
recognized the importance of non-refoulement, stating that "foremost
among the rights which the Protocol would guarantee to refugees is the
prohibition (under Article 33 of the Convention) against their expulsion or
return to any country in which their life or freedom would be threatened."''
[26 However, the non-refoulement duty was not clearly incorporated
into the Immigration and Nationality Act, leading to some confusion
within United States law. Specifically, it was not clear whether Congress
believed that the Protocol's provisions were self-executing within U.S.
law.'4 As a result, the Refugee Act of 198061 was passed in order to bring
United States law into conformity with our international treaty obligations
under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. e
This created a provision entitled "Withholding of Deportation," found at
the Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h).63
[27 The House Committee stated that "the proposed change in section
243(h) is necessary so that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal
obligations under international agreements."'  This purpose was
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Stevic. 6
57. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed Jan. 11, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (entered into force Oct. 4,1967).
58. See id. at Article I(1). One of the purposes of the Protocol was to extend the
Convention's protection to refugees whose status was the result of acts after 1951 and to
eliminate geographical limitations on the protections. These were the only changes which the
Protocol made to the definition of "refugee." The Protocol in no way modified Article 33 of
the Convention.
59. S. Exec.Doc., 90" Cong., 2d Sess, VIII (1968).
60. The debate revolves around whether the Protocol's terms were self-executing, or
whether they only took effect after Congress explicitly incorporated their terms into U.S. law.
See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989). Treaty and Convention terms
which are non-self-executing may in some cases be treated as a form of federal common law,
but generally can not override an existing state or federal law. See e.g., Sei Fujii v. California,
38 Cal.2d 718,242 P.2d 617 (1952).
61. Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (1980).
62. S. REP. No. 96-256 at 141 (1979).
63. The addition of the Withholding of Deportation provision did not affect the existing
statutory provisions for asylum, which involve a less strenuous standard than did the
Withholding provisions.
64. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US. at 436-37 (1987) (discussing legislative intent).
65. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984) ("Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980
amended the language of § 243(h), basically conforming it to the language of Article 33 of the
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Furthermore, the language of the Stevic opinion indicates that the Court
recognized that this obligation, as well as the U.S. desire to meet its
obligation, predated the 1980 amendments. The Court stated that "although
the language through which Congress has implemented this policy.., has
changed slightly from time to time, the basic policy has remained
constant-to provide a haven for homeless refugees and to fulfill American
responsibilities in connection with the International Refugee Organization
of the United Nations."''  Therefore, the obligatory nature of our
commitment under the Convention and Protocol has been repeatedly
confirmed.
[28 Because of the Refugee Convention's mandate, the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that withholding is mandatory, unlike simple asylum,
which is granted at the Attorney General's discretion. Therefore, a refugee
with a meritorious withholding claim has an "entitlement" under U.S. law.6
Because of the mandatory nature of the withholding provision, it was only
available upon a showing of "clear probability" of persecution upon
repatriation.68 As a result, federal courts allowed for special procedural
precautions in withholding of deportation cases.6 The 1996 Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) changed
the withholding provision, renaming it "Restriction on Removal."7° Nothing
in the new law, however, indicated that the mandatory nature of the
provision had changed.7
B. A Troubled History of Compliance: Particularly Serious Crimes
R29 Despite these positive statements regarding compliance, the
United States has always had a troubled and contradictory history in
interpreting the Convention's enumerated exceptions. The "particularly
serious crime" provision, derived from the Conventions' Article 33(2) and
inserted into U.S. law as a bar to Withholding of Deportation, has been the
subject of the most litigation and judicial debate. In 1982, the Board of
Immigrations Appeals indicated that it would apply a contextual approach,
such as has been recommended by many international scholars and
adopted by many Convention signatories. The Matter of Frentescu case
stated that
United Nations Protocol.").
66. Id. at 415 (quoting Rosenberg v. Yee Chin Woo, 402 U.S 49,52 (1971)).
67. Id. at 423, 428 n. 22.
68. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31 (1987). Ordinary asylum may be granted
upon showing a "well-founded fear of persecution."
69. See, e.g., Amanullah v. Cobb, 862 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1988) (requiring advance assurance
of acceptance by third country before deportation to a safe third country); Zavala-Bonilla v.
INS, 730 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that, because of the mandatory nature of
withholding, courts have discretion to review the entirety of the record on appeal).
70. Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 305(a), 110 Stat. 3009, codified at 8 U.S.C.A. §1231(b)(3).
71. Due to the extraordinarily slow nature of immigration proceedings, most of the cases
at the BIA and federal court level, induding all cases cited in this Note, invoked the old
Withholding of Deportation provision.
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[In judging the seriousness of a crime, we look to such factors as
the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying
facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most
importantly, whether the type and circumstances of the crime
indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.
2
30 In 1990, the Ninth Circuit adopted this approach as the proper
inquiry.73  However, in Crespo-Gomez, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
Frentescu, instead holding that the statute established a causal link between
the two-if the immigrant had committed a serious crime, he was
necessarily a danger.74 The BIA followed this approach soon thereafter,
holding that that once an immigrant's crime was determined to be
"particularly serious," it necessarily followed that the immigrant was a
"danger to the community.m In addition, the BIA rejected the balancing
approach, indicating that the severity of persecution faced by the refugee
was irrelevant in applying the bar.76
f31 The Immigration Act of 1990 resolved the split between the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits by establishing a list of so-called "aggravated
felonies" which were to constitute "particularly serious crimes."' Although
the Act did not specify how the new "particularly serious" definition was to
interact with the "danger to the community" language, the federal courts
subsequently interpreted the "aggravated felony" list as establishing per se
dangerousness.' The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act changed the definition of "particularly serious crime" to
specify that aggravated felonies that led to an aggregate term of
imprisonment of at least five years were to be considered "a particularly
serious crime."t ' In addition, IIRAIRA greatly expanded the list of
aggravated felonies that triggered the statutory mandatory bars.
32 When Congress passed the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), it included a provision, Section 413(f), which
expressly gave the INS discretionary authority to withhold the deportation
of individuals subject to the mandatory bars, if the grant of withholding
was necessary to ensure compliance with the 1967 Protocol.' The
provision is a clear statement that Congress did not believe that the
aggravated felony list was co-extensive with the Convention's exception for
"a particularly serious crime" committed by an individual who "constitutes
a danger to the community." However, Congress's attempt to comply with
72. 18 . & N. Dec. 244 (B.I.A. 1982).
73. See Matter of Betran-Zavala, 912 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1990)
74. See 780 F.2d 932,934 (11"' Cir. 1986).
75. See Matter of Carballe, 19 1. & N. Dec. 357,360 (B.I.A. 1986).
76. See Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 L & N. Dec. 208,209-10 (B.I.A. 1985).
77. Pub. L. 101-649 §515(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4978,5053.
78. See generally Matter of Q-T-M-T-, Interim Decision 3300 (B.I.A. 1996), 17 Imm. Rptr. 11-
21,1996 WL 784581 (listing federal court cases construing the statute as a per se rule).
79. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
80. See CHARLEs GORDON, Er AL. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE. § 33.0614][a] (1998);
Abriel, supra note 19, at 370.
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the Convention's mandate was eviscerated by the BIA in Matter of Q-T-M-
T-. The Board, rejecting an advisory opinion of the UNHCR, held that a
deportation under the per se rule could not contravene the 1967 Protocol.
The Board argued that
were we to rely upon UNHCR's opinion and therefore accept the
respondent's position that a categorical classification of per se
'particularly serious crime' contravenes Article 33 of the
Convention, we would be essentially ruling that the United States
has been in violation of the Protocol since 1990 when Congress first
established the aggravated felony bar... 8
That argumente effectively rendered Section 413(f) meaningless.8 The 1996
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA)
repealed the authority granted by Section 413(f) of the AEDPA.?
[33 The results of the five-year per se rule have already appeared in
several cases. In one recent case, an Iranian refugee who faced torture and
possibly death if repatriated, was denied Withholding based upon a
conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin and conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute. The BIA refused to make any finding as
to whether he was a danger to the community because his conviction met
the five-year sentence per se test for "particularly dangerous."8' Similarly,
in the case of a Laotian man, the BIA found that whether the man had
committed the crime "when his mental capacity was in a 'reduced state,"' as
he claimed, was irrelevant to whether he posed a danger.'
[34 For crimes with aggregate sentences of less than five years,
IIRAIRA gave the Attorney General discretion to consider whether they are
"particularly serious" and thus a bar to Restriction on Removal or
81. Matter of Q-T-M-T-, Interim Decision 3300 (B.I.A. 1996), 17 Imm. Rptr. B1-21, 1996 WL
784581.
82. This reasoning is without support in legal doctrine. There is a doctrine of statutory
construction (sometimes known as "the acquiescence rule") which argues that if an executive
agency follows a particular course of action and Congress fails to correct that action, a court
may assume that Congress intended for the law to be applied in that manner. See generally
WILUAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 814 (2d ed. 1995). However, in
this case, Congress affirmatively expressed its dissatisfaction with the existing per se rule by
including Section 413(f) in the AEDPA.
83. The BIA holding thus violated the accepted rule that statutory interpretors should
presume that every phrase is meant to add meaning to the statute. See e.g., American National
Red Cross v. S.G. and A.E., 505 U.S. 247,269 (1992).
84. See GORDON, supra note 80.
85. See In Re H-M-V-, Interim Decision 3365 (B.I.A. 1998), 1998 WL 611753. The BIA
stated that "[t]he regulations specifically address the appropriate interpretation of the Protocol
and the question of whether a separate consideration of an alien's dangerousness to the
community is required," and concluded it was not required. The individual's attempt to
invoke the Convention Against Torture's non-refoulement provision, which makes no
exception for "particularly serious crime[s]," was unavailing because the BIA claimed that the
Convention Against Torture was not self-executing and had not been incorporated into U.S.
law. See id.
86. See In Re S-S-, Interim Decision 3317 (B.I.A. 1997), 1997 WL 258946.
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Withholding.8 In 1996, the BIA decided that immigrants with sentences
less than five years were presumptively ineligible for Withholding of
Deportation. ' Immigrants in that class bore the burden of rebutting their
ineligibility for Withholding of Deportation by showing some "unusual
aspect" of their conviction.9
35 Federal courts acceded to the presumption established in
Q-T-M-T.9 In one case that seems particularly questionable, the District
Court upheld a BIA decision applying the presumption of ineligibility to a
young Laotian refugee sentenced to two years in prison for driving a car
from which a drive-by shooting occurred.9' In another, a Kurdish Iraqi
whose father had actively opposed Saddam Hussein's party was deported
based upon a single conviction in 1992 for controlled substance and
firearms possession for which he had served eighteen months. In that case,
the Sixth Circuit held that the man had "no colorable defense to
deportation."92 In many of these cases, the adjudicators entirely fail to
recognize that Withholding of Deportation is governed by a different
standard than is simple asylum.
[36 The BIA has now backed off from the presumption of ineligibility..
The Board now states that Q-T-M-T- was premised upon section 413(f) of
AEDPA, now repealed. This is a convoluted argument: that a section
intended to help the INS comply with its international obligation to
refugees had the effect of establishing a presumption against the refugees.
The Attorney General still has the statutory authority to consider crimes
with sentences less than five years to be "particularly serious" and the new
BIA decision does not establish any criteria for determining when this
discretion should be exercised.
[37 The expansion of the "particularly serious crime" bar has the
potential to exclude a vast number of immigrants with valid claims for
non-refoulement. Although the term "aggravated felony" conjures up
visions of crimes that would certainly be considered "particularly serious,"
the U.S. immigration law employs a much broader definition of the term.
The "aggravated felony" definitional grab-bag now includes crimes as
varied as fraud, tax evasion, theft, bribery, and illegal entry or re-entry into
this country by one previously deported, without any view to whether the
87. 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)..
88. See In Re Q-T-M-T-, Interim Decision 3300 (B.I.A. 1996), 17 Imm. Rptr. B1-21, 1996 WL
784581. This holding was applied in subsequent BIA decisions. See e.g., In Re H-M-V-, Interim
Decision 3365 (B.I.A. 1998), 1998 WL 611753. However, in at least one case, the BIA rejected
the Q-T-M-T- presumption of ineligibility in favor of a contextual balancing approach for
crimes with sentences under five years. See e.g., In Re L-S-J-, Interim Decision 3322 (B.I.A.
1997), 1997 WL 423130 (deporting 26-year old to Haiti based on finding that robbery with a
handgun of about $600 from various individuals constituted a "particularly serious crime.").
89. See e.g., In Re H-M-V-, Interim Decision 3365 (B.I.A. 1998), 1998 WL 611753.
90. See e.g., Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29 (1' Cir. 1997) (holding that alien was not entitled
to a separate finding on dangerousness to community under the Refugee Convention).
91. Morisath v. Smith, 988 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Wa. 1997).
92. See Daniel v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 138 F.3d 1102, 1103 (6"' Cir.
1998).
93. See In Re S-S-, Interim Decision 3317 (B.I.A. 1997), 1997 WL 258946.
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crimes were committed in a violent or particularly harmful manner.'
38 The requirement that this crime merits a sentence of five or more
years must be evaluated within the context of the United States's strict
sentencing guidelines and rising mandatory minimums. In addition,
thanks to a 1988 BIA decision, even a suspended sentence is still considered
a "sentence" for INA purposes.9 IIRAIRA not only did not overturn this
holding, but in fact codified this practice, stating that "[a]ny reference to a
term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to
include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of
law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that
imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.06 This provision is
particularly offensive to the Convention because if a court has suspended a
criminal's sentence, leaving them at liberty within society, one must
presume that the court did not find them to be a danger to the community.
As a result of this provision, an individual serving a five-year suspended
sentence for a crime like fraud could be returned to a country where he will
be killed, despite not having committed a "particularly serious crime" or
being a danger to the U.S. community.
139 The vast majority of "criminal aliens" are convicted for non-violent
offenses. In 1994, drug-related offenses accounted for forty-five percent of
the prosecution of non-citizens, while immigration violations accounted for
thirty-four percent and violent crimes only 1.4 percent.' The frequency of
prosecutions for immigration violations is particularly telling, as
individuals facing certain death or imprisonment in their home country
have a particular incentive to try to circumvent the immigration laws. The
mean term of incarceration imposed for immigration violations in 1994
(prior to the IIRAIRA increase in sentences) was 22.6 months.' And the
United States has been steadily increasing the number of immigrants
removed each year because of their criminal history. For example, during
the first half of 1997, 67 percent more immigrants were removed because of
federal convictions than were removed in the first half of 1996.9 In 1997
and 1998, more than 106,000 immigrants with criminal records were
deported, a 52% increase over the preceding two years."°
94. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43).
95. Matter of Ozkok, 19 1. & N. 546 (B.I.A. 1988)
96. IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208 §322(a)(1)(B) (1996).
97. See Helen Morris, Zero Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74
INr\RPRETER RELEAsEs 1319, 1322 (Aug. 29, 1997). See also In Re S-S-, Interim Decision 3317
(B.I.A. 1997), 1997 WL 258946 (applying law to Laotian who had received a five-year
suspended sentence and two years of probation).
98. Id. at 1319
99. See Paul Virtue, Acting Executive Association Commissioner Programs, Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, House
Judiciary Committee (July 15,1997), available at 1997 WL 11234766.
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C. A New Cause for Worry: Political Crimes Committed in Country of
Origin
40 The applicability of the "serious, non-political crime outside the
country of refuge" came before the Supreme Court this term.'' As a result,
the Supreme Court has now clarified some of the questions surrounding
this bar to Withholding.
[41 In this case, Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre claimed asylum and
withholding of deportation based upon probable imprisonment or death
upon repatriation.' 2 Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre states that in his home country
of Guatemala, he was involved in student protests against the government
which involved burning several buses, after having ousted the passengers,
and otherwise disrupting the government through private property
damage and protests. The Immigration Judge who initially heard his case
found Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre entirely credible and found that his crimes
were sufficiently "political" in nature. The INS appealed the award of
Withholding.
42 Upon appeal, the BIA found that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre was not
barred from Withholding based upon having committed terrorist acts, nor
was he barred by virtue of being a danger to the security of the United
States. Nonetheless, the BIA found Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre ineligible for
Withholding and ordered him deported based upon their conclusion that
the common criminality of his acts outweighed any political justification
for them."n The BIA opinion did not give any deference to the Immigration
Judge's assessment of the historical facts, and seemed to suggest that Mr.
Aguirre-Aguirre did not deserve Withholding because of his criminal
history. As Withholding of Deportation, unlike simple asylum, is not
discretionary, the Attorney General is not authorized to make a
discretionary determination as to the individual's merit-Mr. Aguirre-
Aguirre should have been granted Withholding unless his crimes were
both "serious" and "non-political."'
43 The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA because it failed to follow the
mandates set forth by the Refugee Convention and Protocol. The panel
cited an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion, McMullen v. Immigration and
Nationalization Service. McMullen applied the Convention's exception for
individuals who had committed a "serious, non-political crime" to deport
an individual who had bombed innocent civilians.'5 In Aguirre-Aguirre, the
Ninth Circuit again applied the Refugee Convention and specifically
invoked the UNHCR recommendations governing the application of the
101. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S.Ct. 39,66 U.S.L.W. 3720,67 U.S.L.W. 3195,67 U.S.L.W.
3228 (U.S. Oct. 5,1998).
102. 121 F.3d 521 (9"' Cir. 1997).
103. See id. at 522.
104. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
105. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1986). The McMuller court considered several factors to
determine whether the act was "political": whether the act was sufficiently linked to its
political objectives, whether the act was disproportionate to the political objectives, and the
degree of atrocity of the act. Id. at 596-97.
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"serious, non-political crime" exception.'6 As a result, the Ninth Circuit
found that Mr. Aguirre-Aguirre's acts were both political in nature and not
serious enough, when balanced against the threat he faced in Guatemala, to
warrant departure from non-refoulement.
f44 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Ninth
Circuit's decision.'7 The Supreme Court reversal hinges essentially on the
standard of review and the degree of deference due to agency
determinations under the Chevron doctrine.1"' The BIA found that the
criminal nature of the acts outweighed their political nature, and the Court
found that to be a reasonable finding, which could not be overturned by
the federal courts. Furthermore, the Court deferred to the BIA's
determination that the severity of persecution need not be factored into a
determination of whether the crimes was "serious", thus rejecting the
balancing method favored by the UNHCR and the European Court of
Human Rights.'"
f45 The Aguirre-Aguirre decision fails to recognize the importance of
international law standards to how the Withholding law should be
applied. The Court states that "the [Ninth Circuit] should have asked
whether 'the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue' before it; if so 'the question for the court [was] whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.""1 By treating
this solely as a question of deference to agency interpretation, the Court
ignores the federal court's obligation to construe statutes so as to avoid
conflict with international law."' In fact, the Court treats the international
nature of this issue as reason for increased deference."2 The Court admits
that the UNHCR handbook "provides some guidance" and "may be a
useful interpretative aid""3, but the opinion implies that the BIA has the
discretionary authority to reject this guidance at will. Thus, the Aguirre-
Aguirre decision is dangerous not for what it says-the language in the
case, for the most part, comports with international law. Rather, the
opinion is dangerous because of what it fails to say about the importance of
adhering to international law.
D. The Campaign Against Terrorism
[46 The U.S. immigration law also provides that any individual who
106. See 121 F.3d at 523-24.
107. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 1999 WL 257638.
108. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
109. See nn. 51-53 & text accompanying.
110. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 1999 WL 257638 (quoting INS v. Cardona-Fonseca, 480
U.S. at 448-49).
111. See nn. 132,136 & text accompanying.
112. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 1999 WL 257638 ("The judiciary is not well positioned to
shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such
diplomatic repercussions.")
113. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 1999 WL 257638
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has engaged or is engaged in terrorist activities" 4 is considered to be a
threat to the security of the U.S. and thus ineligible for Restriction on
Removal."5 Although this provision seems reasonable on its face; it goes far
beyond the bounds of the Convention. The Convention allows for
refoulement if the individual is a danger to the security of the United
States, was convicted of a particularly serious non-political crime abroad, or
has committed crimes against humanity or peace. However, the definition
of "engaged in terrorist activities" employed by the INA includes
sabotaging any type of conveyance, the use of explosives to cause
substantial property damage, providing any type of material support
(including transportation) to terrorists, or performing any sort of
recruitment for a terrorist organization or government." 6  This broad
definition includes activities that may be political protest acts. In addition,
if these acts were directed at a repressive government, there is no
"reasonable grounds" for believing the actors would pose any threat to U.S.
security.
f47 The terrorism exception is further complicated by the lack of
procedural protection for immigrants charged with past terrorist acts." 7
The 1996 AEDPA added a new removal procedure for alleged terrorists.
Evidence substantiating charges of terrorist activity can now be submitted
ex parte and in camera, and under seal of court, to a special removal
court."8 With this system in place, immigrants charged with terrorism do
not know what evidence the government has against them and so they
cannot effectively defend themselves. For instance, an immigrant who
provided material support to a terrorist organization under threat of death
may have an affirmative defense to the terrorism charges and certainly
would not pose a security threat to the United States. In addition, the
government may use evidence obtained illegally, and therefore perhaps
unreliably."9 This lack of process accorded to refugees constitutes another
violation of the Refugee Convention" and probably also of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."'
148 As of December 1998, the INS had brought about two dozen
deportation cases based on secret terrorism charges. "2 For instance, Yahia
Meddah came to this country from Algeria and claimed that he faced
persecution from Algerian opposition forces who had already kidnapped
and killed several members of his family. He was accused of involvement
114. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
115. 8 U.S.C.A. 1231(b)(3)(B).
116. 8 U.S.C.A. 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii).
117. See generally Jennifer Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches?: The AntiTerrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act's Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L. J. 693 (1998).
118. 8 U.S.C.A. §1533 (1997).
119. See AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 401(a), 110
Stat. at 1262, codified at 8 U.S.C.A § 1534(e)(1)(B).
120. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 32(2).
121. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.14(3)(a), opened for
signature Dec. 16,1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23,1975).
122. Benjamin Weiser, Immigrant Held on Secret Data Faces False Statement Charge, N.Y.
Tr.Es, Dec. 9,1998, at B5.
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in terrorism, but not presented with any evidence to support the charges.
His application for asylum and Withholding of Deportation was denied.ln
In another case, several Iraqi asylum seekers were ordered deported based
on unspecified counts of terrorism and after a secret hearing in which they
were not allowed to see any evidence or to hear any witnesses. These
individuals face near certain death upon return to Iraq, as they had acted in
concert with U.S. intelligence forces while participating in Iraqi dissident
groups which have since been eliminated by the regime; some claim that
Saddam Hussein has already attempted to have them killed. On appeal,
some of the evidence in their case was de-classified and subsequently
deemed to be insubstantial." The INS's explanation was particularly
disturbing: "We don't do investigations," said general counsel Paul Virtue,
"There is a low evidentiary threshold for finding whether someone is
eligible for asylum here. It is wholly unlike a criminal case, where the
burden is on the Government to prove someone has committed an
offense."1
E. Procedural Difficulties Posed by Expedited Removal
' f49 The primary procedural change enacted by IIRAIRA was the so-
called "expedited removal process" for immigrants who arrive at the
border with no immigration documents or with fraudulent documents.
Under the new law, those immigrants may be returned to their home
country immediately, unless they indicate a "credible fear" of persecution
which would warrant a grant of asylum or Restriction on Removal. Since
the passage of URAIRA, this procedure has been much criticized by
immigration advocates because it subjects tired, scared refugees to a
summary procedure, which they are unlikely to understand, without
providing them with counsel.'2 Expedited removal has already had an
enormous impact on the' face of immigration law; the majority of
individuals deported are now individuals entering the U.S. at the
Southwest border with no immigration documents or fraudulent
immigration documentsIV Between August of 1997 and the end of January
1998,1300 individuals with fraudulent or no documents expressed a fear of
123. William Branigan, Asylum Seeker Escapes from Hospital, Flees U.S., WASH. Posr, Nov. 1,
1998, at A22. Mr. Meddah, who had become suicidal during INS detention, escaped from a
mental institution and fled to seek relief in Canada.
124. James Risen, Evidence to Deny 6 Iraquis Asylum May Be Weak, Files Show, N.Y. T"vIEs,
Oct. 13,1998 at Al.
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Dulce Foster, Note, Judge, Jury and Executioner: INS Summary-Exclusion Power
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 82 MINN. L. REv.
209 (1997). But see Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum Screening Under the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,29 CONN. L. REv. 1501 (1997)
(arguing that the expedited removal procedures appear to comply with U.S. obligations under
the Refugee Convention).
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return to their home country. Out of that number, 1066 were deported
through expedited removal.'28
[50 In addition to the pressure on individual asylum applicants,
expedited removal also raises serious worries over the application of the
statutory bars to individuals potentially eligible for Restriction on
Removal. Although the implementation of this process may vary
according to INS district, one INS official has stated that it is INS policy to
refuse credible fear interviews to immigrants who are subject to one of the
mandatory bars." The official insisted that asylum officers will not apply
the bars unless the immigrant admits to the facts, or the INS official has
independent "proof."'- For instance, if an immigrant admits to a criminal
record or the officer has a record of the conviction, the immigrant may be
returned home without even a credible fear interview. It seems likely that
fine distinctions, such as the difference between a political crime and a
common crime, will frequently be lost in this expedited process. An honest
immigrant who admits to a conviction in his home country may find
himself on a plane back home, without a chance to explain that the
conviction was related to political persecution. In addition, not all first-
level immigration officials may be aware of the differences between the
mandatory bars for asylum' and the much narrower bars for Restriction
on Removal. The expedited removal process may therefore create serious
risk of Convention violations that will never be discovered because the
refugee will never have the opportunity to assert a claim for non-
refoulement.
F. International Law Claims in U.S. Courts
[51 International law is a recognized part of the law that governs the
United States and is subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court system.
In 1900, the Supreme Court clarified that it would enforce the dictates of
international law, stating that: '"International law is part of our law and
must be ascertained and administered by courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending on it are duly
presented for their determination. 03 Treaties are declared to be the law of
128. Mirta Ojita, Inconsistences at INS complicate Refugees' Asylum Quest, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
22,1998, at B2.
129. Roundtable Meeting led by Phyllis Coven, Director of International Affairs,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, in Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1997). Approximately
1200 individuals per week are subject to expedited removal procedures. Of that, about five
percent are referred for a credible fear interview. About eighty percent of those interviewed
are found to have credible fear, at which point they are allowed to remain in the United States
(frequently in detention) until their asylum and Restriction on Removal claims are
adjudicated. See OFFICE OF PuB. AFFAms, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., FACT
SHEET UPDATE ON EXPEDITED REMOVALS (July 9,1997).
130. See Roundtable Meeting, supra note 123.
131. See Immigration and National Act, § 208 (1997).
132. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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the land by Article VI of the Constitution.n In addition, customary
international law is now considered a type of federal common law which is
supreme over state law based on Article VI of the Constitution. 34 As with
any law, it is reasonable to look to other jurisdictions for views on how to
interpret the law. Therefore, the interpretations accorded the Convention
and Protocol by other signatory states can provide persuasive, non-binding
authority.
I52 As with any federal law, Congress has the authority to repeal
treaty law by implication through subsequent enactments. The Supreme
Court made this clear in 1888, stating that "if there be any conflict between
the stipulations of the treaty and the requirements of the [subsequent] law,
the latter must control."'-" However, on numerous occasions the Court has
emphasized that federal courts have a duty to attempt to construe
subsequent legislation so as to avoid a conflict.'T There is much room for
statutory construction within the language of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
f53 Several provisions discussed earlier in this Note seem particularly
amenable to this doctrine of presumption against derogating from
international law. For instance, although the statute clearly specifies that
certain crimes constitute a "particularly serious crime," it says nothing
about whether the refugee must also be shown to be a "danger to the
community." In fact, the most natural reading of the language is that this is
a two-prong requirement. If Congress had wanted to establish a rule of per
se dangerousness, it easily could have stated "by virtue of having committed
a particularly serious crime, is a danger to the community" or "is a danger
to the community in that he has committed a particularly serious crime."
Or, Congress could have eliminated the "danger to the community"
language entirely. 37 Instead, Congress enacted and re-enacted the exact
language of the Refugee Convention, strongly suggesting that it wished to
133. Note, however, that the current prevailing view is that, "a "Non-self-executing"
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation."
Restatement (Third) of the Law, §111.
134. See Restatement (Third) of the Law, Part I, Chapter 2, Introductory Note.
135. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law,
Part I, Chapter 2, Introductory Note ("Like the strictly domestic law of the US, international
law as law of the US is subject to the Constitution, and is also subject to "repeal" by other laws
of the US.").
136. Id. ("When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of
either."); see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 188, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804)
(Marshall, J.) ("An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains..."). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law, § 114
("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with
international law or with an international agreement of the United States."); Restatement
(Third) of the Law, §115(a) ("An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law
or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the
act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or
provision cannot be fairly reconciled.")
137. Under the current construction employed by the BIA and most federal courts, the
"danger to the community" language is entirely superflous. See infra note 83.
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comply with its duties under this law.
54 Another example is the definition of "particularly serious crime."
The law clearly states that crimes with aggregate sentences of more than
five years are "particularly serious" and thus will invoke the exception to
Withholding of Deportation or Restriction on Removal. However, the law
gives the Attorney General discretion as to crimes with sentences of less
than five years. In many cases, the exercise of this discretion puts the U.S.
in conflict with the Refugee Convention. Courts should presume that
Congress did not intend for this discretion to be exercised in contravention
of our treaty obligations.
55 There are other areas of the law in which the statutory terminology
creates a clear conflict with the Convention and Protocol obligations. For
instance, the provisions regarding those accused of terrorist acts go far
beyond what is allowed by the Convention to protect the security of the
host country. In cases where the statutory language is clear, the federal
courts probably have no authority to follow the Convention rather than the
subsequent federal law. However, as Charles Evan Hughes advised
President Wilson, "Congress has the power to violate treaties, but if they
are violated, the Nation will be none the less exposed to all the
international consequences of such a violation.. .The treaty still exists even
although it may not be enforceable by the courts or administrative
authorities.""' Although the federal courts are divested of their
jurisdiction,'39 the United States's obligation under international law
remains perfectly intact. It is well accepted that, "when international law
is not given effect in the United States because of constitutional limitation
or supervening domestic law, the international obligations of the United
States remain and the United States may be in default."' 4°  Therefore,
although the federal courts may lack the power to act when the
Immigration and Nationality Act is in clear contravention of the Refugee
Convention, it does not change the fact that the United States is violating
its duties under binding international law.
III. CONCLUSION
56 Comparing the U.S. law with the manner in which the Convention
is interpreted by both international legal scholars and other party nations is
a distressing task. Although the U.S. Congress and courts pay much lip
service to Convention adherence, there appears to have been little attempt
to ascertain what individuals outside of the U.S. federal court system think
138. Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes, Memorandum prepared for Pres. Harding,
Oct. 8,1921, in 5 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 185-86,324-25 (1943).
139. Whitney, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), suggested that the issue was one of judicial authority,
not legal right: Whether the complaining nation has just cause of complaint, or our country
was justified in its legislation, are not matters for judicial cognizance..."
140. Restatement (Third) of the Law, Part I, Chapter 2, Introductory Note. See also
Restatement (Third) of the Law, §115(b) ("That a rule of international law or a provision of an
international agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its
international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.")
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this Convention means.141
157 It is evident that at least some American jurists honestly believe
that the mandatory and discretionary bars fall within the parameters
established by the Convention's exceptions. One could attempt to justify
the vast U.S. "aggravated felony" bar under the Convention's "particularly
serious crime" provision. However the U.S. has ignored the predominant
international law in this area in at least three ways:
By conflating the two independent requirements of "conviction of a
particularly serious crime" and "danger to the community" through
the use of a per se rule;
By refusing to implement any sort of a balancing test which would
consider the threat which the immigrant would face upon
repatriation; and
By expanding the class of crimes warranting repatriation to include
a vast number of non-violent crimes with no aggravating
circumstances.'4
Similarly, the U.S. laws governing prior terrorist activity could be
justified under either the "danger to the security" exception in Article
33, the "serious non-political crime" provision of Article 1, or the
exceptions for humanitarian law violators contained in Article 1.
However, in order to comply with the bulk of international precedent,
the U.S. should:
Allow an affirmative defense of political activity for crimes which
were not targeted at civilians;
Only apply the human rights law violation exceptions to
individuals who were actual participants or had supervisory
authority over the violations;
Require a showing that the individual constitutes an on-going
threat to the existence or stability of the U.S. for any repatriation
that is not dependent on the exceptions for serious non-political
crimes, particularly serious crimes, or humanitarian law violations.
141. However, in the recent oral argument of the Aguirre-Aguirre case, one of the Justices
did inquire about how other countries interpret the Protocol and convention. See 1999 WL
141033 at 5.
142. The UNHCR has consistantly argued that the "aggravated felony" bar is inconsistent
with Article 33(2) of the Convention. See Amicus Brief of United Nations High Commissioner
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f58 Although the United States has indicated a desire to comply with
its obligations under international treaties, past experience has shown that
political exigency will usually triumph over even clear-cut treaty
obligations. A specific case in point with regards to non-refoulement is Sale
v. Haitian Centers Council, in which the Supreme Court upheld the policy of
returning Haitian refugees intercepted on the high seas based essentially
upon the reasoning that, despite what the French say, "refoule" does not
mean retum.'4 However, this does not make the treaty obligation any less
binding, nor the moral obligation any less compelling.
I59 If one can get past the media spin regarding "criminal aliens" and
"aggravated felons," one sees that the U.S. can easily comply with its
obligations under the Convention while still protecting its citizenry from
dangerous individuals. This was the goal of the Convention drafters, and
it has been the predominant mode of Convention interpretation
throughout Europe. If the United States were to adopt a more nuanced
approach and abandon its excessively strict per se rules, it could fulfill both
its treaty obligations and its promise to be a refuge for the persecuted and
endangered.
143. See 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
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